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19
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (13 Dec 67) FOR OT RD-670741

19 December 1967

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d
Battalion, 11th Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1967**

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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3
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION, 11TH ARTILLERY
APO 96355

AVGE-VF

31 July 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (RCS-GS For-65) (U)

THUR: Commanding General
Task Force OREGON
ATTN: G3
APO 96374

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHG-DST
APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army (ACSFOR, DA)
Washington, D. C., 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION AND UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (U) Administration and Personnel:

a. The 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery remains attached to Task Force OREGON (TFO) as one of the medium artillery battalions for the Task Force.

b. Personnel strength of the command on 31 July 1967 was:

	TOE AUTH			MTOE PENDING			ASSIGNED		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
Headquarters Battery	19	1	135	0	0	0	19	1	135
A Battery	3	0	111	1	0	4	3	0	116
B Battery	3	0	111	1	0	4	4	0	116
C Battery	3	0	111	1	0	4	3	0	112
Service Battery	2	3	84	0	0	4	2	2	80
TOTALS	30	4	552	3	0	12	31	3	567

c. This unit currently has no critical MOS shortages and the unit has just completed a personnel infusion program transferring 4 officers and 124 enlisted men.

d. Personnel changes during the quarter include:

GAINS	OFF	WO	EM	LOSSES	OFF	WO	EM
	6	0	23		7	0	31

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4

AVCE-VF 31 July 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

e. Casualties included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Killed in action	0
Wounded in action	5
Missing in action	0
Non battle dead	0
Non battle casualties	3

f. Awards and Decorations to members of the command included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Silver Star	0
Legion of Merit	1
Bronze Star (Valor)	1
Bronze Star (Merit)	0
Air Medal (Merit)	1
Air Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster)	1
Commendation Medal (Valor)	0
Commendation Medal (Merit)	3
Purple Heart	2

NOTE: In addition to these awards, thirteen (13) recommendations for awards have been submitted and are pending approval by TFO.

g. R&R Program schedules include the following:

(1) In-Country R&R consists of 3 day passes to China Beach, DANANG; these facilities have been utilized by eighteen (18) personnel. Presently this battalion is receiving nine (9) quotas per month, which is an insufficient number of quotas for the strength of this battalion.

(2) Out-of-Country R&R included the following 5 day quotas:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Hawaii	19	5	7	31
Tokyo	16	11	18	45
Taipei	0	1	11	12
Hong Kong	3	13	14	30
Bangkok	8	11	10	29
Singapore	3	2	4	9
Penang	0	3	4	7
Manila	3	1	2	6
Kuala Lumpur	0	3	2	5

h. Judicial and Non-Judicial actions by units included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ART 15</u>	<u>SGM</u>	<u>SPCM</u>	<u>GCM</u>
Headquarters Battery	3	0	0	0
A Battery	1	0	0	0
B Battery	5	0	3	0
C Battery	1	0	0	0
Service Battery	1	0	0	0
TOTALS	11	0	3	0

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AVGE-VF

31 July 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

i. Unit mail clerks pick up and deliver mail to the nearest APO which is 96355. This APO services the 3d Bde, 25th Division at Duc Pho, RVN. This APO was acquired on 9 July 1967 and will insure more rapid delivery of mail than was received from Chu Lai.

j. Pertinent Medical Service Statistics include:

Total patient visits (Unit Personnel)	484
Admitted to hospital	33
Evacuated within the country	10
Evacuated out of country	6
Malaria cases	0

k. Reportable accidents included:

UNIT	VEHICLE	AIRCRAFT	PERSONNEL
Headquarters Battery	0	0	1
A Battery	0	0	1
B Battery	1	0	0
C Battery	1	0	0
Service Battery	0	0	0
TOTALS	2	0	2

l. The morale of the command is outstanding. Beach facilities at Duc Pho are provided on a daily basis to a limited number of personnel. Special Services has provided current motion pictures.

m. Educational opportunities have been provided by USAF extension courses, and Ft Sill extension courses. Several enlisted men and officers have written directly to each headquarters inquiring and receiving information and courses.

n. Religious services are provided on a regular basis by Protestant and Catholic chaplains. Services are available to all batteries each week.

o. Throughout the battalion, personal hygiene, prophylactic usage and frequent lectures on venereal diseases have helped in maintaining a low percentage of V. D.

2. (U) Intelligence:

a. This headquarters did not have an aerial observation section during the reporting period. However, by utilizing the aircraft assigned to TFO Artillery, limited reconnaissance was performed on an unscheduled basis.

3. (C) Training:

a. On-the-job training and individual cross training continues in all units of the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery. Personnel from Survey, Wire Sections and Forward Observer Sections have been cross trained in fire direction techniques, as Forward Observers, and in Liaison Procedures.

b. The following periods of mandatory training were conducted during the reporting period:

- (1) Code of Conduct: 1 Hour
- (2) Character Guidance: 2 Hours
- (3) Weapons Familiarization: 1 Hour
- (4) Command Information: 3 Hours

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AVCE-VF

31 July 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

c. A total of 19 personnel have received replacement training during the period. Training was conducted by the NGO Academy, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry.

d. On 16 June 1967, SGT Frank D Pugh, SGT Donald E. Smith and SGT Lee H. Smith attended out-of-country weapons training.

4. (C) Operations

a. Normal operations consistent with the battalion's mission were conducted during the reporting period.

b. On 1 May 1967, the battalion (minus A and B Batteries) with Battery C, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery OPCON arrived via LST at DUC PHO. Mission of the battalion was General Support-Reinforcing the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery and the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery while participating in Operation BAKER and Operation MALHUR.

c. Battery A deployed to DUC PHO by LST and joined the battalion on 8 May 1967.

d. On 4 June 1967, the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery formed a fourth battery. This was called Battery D. It was composed of two howitzers each from Batteries A and C. The battery was air lifted by CH-53 and CH-47 helicopters to MO DUC to support operations opening Highway 1 from QUANG NGAI to DUC PHO. While at MO DUC, "Delta" was deactivated and replaced by Battery B, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery on 16 June 1967.

e. Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was airlifted by CH-47, CH-53 and CH-54 to LZ CHAMPS on 6 June 1967. Battery C has remained in that location since deployment.

f. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery deployed by convoy on the newly opened Highway from CHU LAI to MO DUC and relieved "Delta" Battery on 16 June 1967. The convoy, of which Battery B was a part, was the first convoy to travel that portion of Highway 1 in over 2 1/2 years. Battery B has remained in position at MO DUC since that time.

g. On 18 July 1967, Battery D was reactivated. The Battery consisted of two howitzers from Battery A, with personnel coming from throughout the battalion. The battery deployed by CH-53 to GIA VUC Special Forces Camp. Mission of the battery was Direct Support of GIA VUC Special Forces CIDG and Montagnard Companies. The battery fired 3,272 rounds. Battery D was deactivated on 29 July 1967.

h. On 10 May 1967, Battery B fired the 100,000th round for 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, since arriving in country on 18 December 1966. On 25 July 1967, Battery A fired the 100,000th round in support of Task Force OREGON since 19 April 1967. The battalion will fire the 200,000th round during the first week of August 1967.

i. The missions with total amounts of ammunition expended during this reporting period are listed below:

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AVGE-VF 31 July 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

UNIT	MISSIONS	AMMO EXPENDED	DAILY AVERAGE
Battery A	3662	34,309	373
Battery B	3437	29,730	323
Battery C	3483	32,980	358
Battery D	1127	8,019	334
TOTALS	11,709	105,038	1143
G/3/18	4027	12,787	139

5. (U) Logistics:

a. The supply situation during the reporting period has shown a marked improvement. At the beginning of the period, the direct support unit was still busy getting established, as were all of the units in Task Force OREGON. Consequently, reaction to requests was somewhat slow and certain items were very hard to obtain. As the unit had a chance to become established and adapt itself to the new units which it was supporting, the general supply situation improved tremendously, and by the close of the reporting period, excellent support was being received. The difficulty in obtaining certain items from TA 50-901 has improved during this reporting period.

b. Maintenance support was very similar to supply support. The vehicular maintenance support has been adequate; however, the support for the 155MM howitzers, at first, was somewhat lacking. This was caused by the fact that the Direct Support battalion had never supported a towed 155MM unit and consequently had to "start from scratch" on their ASL. Again, as in the case of supply support, as the unit had a chance to get established, the support improved.

c. The supply of expendable items (radiosondes, balloons, and parachutes) for the organic meteorological section has been a constant problem. Only limited quantities of these items have been received through normal supply channels. The same is true for basic repair parts. Requests for 216 radiosondes, 216 battery packs, and 972 calcium hydride charges have been on requisition for 44 days, but none has been received.

d. There is a definite decrease in the quantity and quality of support from the direct support units when a unit arrives in a new area and is supported by new direct support units. Support of common items such as motor vehicles is fairly easy to establish. However, support of an item such as a 155MM towed howitzer by a unit which has no experience with the weapon takes time to establish and creates many problems.

SECTION II OBSERVATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration:

None.

2. (U) Intelligence:

a. ITEM: Visual Reconnaissance

(1) DISCUSSION: Though this unit lacks an aviation section, visual reconnaissance has become a valuable and effective tool. Whenever the unit can obtain aircraft, various aerial observers (AO) are sent up to observe their assigned areas only. AO is most often an additional duty.

AVGE-VF

31 July 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

General surveillance was initiated, followed by specific area reconnaissance after sufficient intelligence information had been gathered. Each specific area was flown by the same AO to insure maximum knowledge of the area on his part. Much of the information brought back by the AO can be used by the S3 when programming H&I's. The AO may break his area down even further according to enemy movements, sudden appearance of new bunkers, disappearance of normal activity, and anti-air fire.

(2) OBSERVATION: The above method, tried and tested by this unit, has enhanced the VR program immensely and has developed more detailed intelligence information.

b. ITEM: Perimeter Defense

(1) DISCUSSION: As an artillery unit, this battalion has habitually been placed on the outside of every base camp it has occupied. Because of this, perimeter defense becomes of paramount concern. The normal solution to the problem of perimeter defense is the construction of a line of bunkers which ring the periphery of the defended position. To this is added a strong defensive wire arrangement which include trip flares and mines. Having built several base camps and the accompanying defense layout, this unit has come up with what it feels constitutes the most satisfactory bunker design. The general configuration of the bunker is circular in shape, constructed with a framework of 6"X8" timbers. The top is covered with PSP followed by at least two, (preferably three) layers of sandbags. The circular sides are comprised of three layers of sandbags with appropriate reinforcement. It is suggested that if no wooden walls are constructed to support the sandbag wall, 105MM howitzer ammunition rods be driven through the sandbags intermittently so as to interlock different levels. Some units do not mount their automatic weapons or lay them on a specific direction, preferring to keep the crew served weapons unmounted; but from this unit's observation these units have had more accidents and produce much less effective fire as a result of this practice. The battalion has utilized a double apron barbed wire fence located between two fences of triple concertina. It is highly advisable to comply with Field Manual 5-15 on barrier construction, particularly laying concertina. When the wire is staked down, it impedes the enemy advancement more than when it is left lying on the ground.

In addition, two-man supplemental bunkers have been constructed on an average of two or three between each main bunker. They are utilized by the reaction force in the event of ground attack and serve to secure the areas between the main bunkers and provide for a greater volume of fire across the entire perimeter. These supplemental bunkers are provided with overhead cover to afford personnel protection from both enemy support weapons and close-in defensive firing.

The final consideration in the effectiveness of a perimeter defense is the personnel. Their attitude must be one of constant vigilance. Maintain two men on duty while two are sleeping. These men must be cognizant of the tremendous importance of their role in securing their area.

(2) OBSERVATION: Stressing both constant vigilance and continued improvement of the barrier plan has effectively augmented the physical security of this unit.

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AVGE-VF

31 July 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

3. (U) Training and Organization:

a. ITEM: Replacement Training

(1) DISCUSSION: Replacement training for individual replacements is necessary to indoctrinate replacements toward operating under combat conditions. Replacements for artillery units obtain an infantry orientation, tactics and weapons familiarization. Even though this type training is not necessary for an artilleryman, it does provide the individual with an understanding of why the infantryman needs artillery support.

(2) OBSERVATION: Artillery replacements benefit from infantry oriented replacement training.

b. ITEM: Driver Training

(1) DISCUSSION: Driving on narrow and heavily crowded roads in RVN is a new experience for most drivers. Defensive driving techniques are stressed. In addition, the assistant driver is an absolute must, for he becomes a co-pilot, "shotgun", and essential pair of eyes looking for hazards along the road.

(2) OBSERVATION: Drivers and assistant drivers must be made aware of defensive driving techniques and the hazards of driving in RVN.

4. (C) Operations:

a. ITEM: Survey Sun Shot

(1) DISCUSSION: Because of the guerrilla tactics employed in RVN, the survey section cannot perform target area survey, and position area survey is accomplished only within a limited and secure area. Most of the survey for a battery position is initiated by taking an astronomic observation. Because this technique is utilized extensively, each individual with the survey section is trained to perform this survey mission.

(2) OBSERVATION: Survey personnel are instructed and trained in the procedures of performing astronomic observations. This procedure is utilized extensively in a battery position to establish survey control and directional control.

b. ITEM: Visual METRO Observation

(1) DISCUSSION: On several occasions, operations required a battery to be deployed outside the effective meteorological range of the battalion. Since the unit was not close to another element providing metro data, it was necessary to send one team to obtain metro data by visual means. This method proved very beneficial; however, it limited the capability of the section at the Battalion level because insufficient equipment was left to obtain data by visual means as a back up to the electronic system.

(2) OBSERVATION: When a battery is out of meteorological range, a team to obtain data by visual means is necessary. However, equipment becomes critical, for only enough equipment is authorized for one team to perform visual observation.

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10

AVGE-VF

SUBJECT: Operations Report-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

31 July 1967

c. ITEM: Permanent Installation of FM Radios

(1) DISCUSSION: Because the battalion fire direction center remains relatively stable in one location, FM radios with mounts are installed within the FDC bunkers to provide continuous communications. This enables the radio vehicle to be utilized for other purposes. However, upon movement these radios and mounts must be reinstalled which creates a maintenance problem as well as becoming a time consuming operation. The TO&E does not provide the personnel by MOS to perform the reinstallation of radios.

(2) OBSERVATION: Radios and mounts for FDC are installed in the bunkers for continuous operations. Reinstallation upon movement becomes time consuming and maintenance personnel from outside sources must be utilized to supervise this operation.

d. ITEM: Boresight Stand

(1) DISCUSSION: When a firing battery is moved by helicopter to perform a mission, only limited equipment essential to the mission can be taken. To insure boresight requirements are completed, the test target is utilized. The support for the test target consists of two eight (8) foot engineer stakes with a wire around the top to hold the stakes together; once driven in the ground. The target is moved up or down to the desired height, and when the boresight has been completed, it is lowered to the ground eliminating any mask problems.

(2) OBSERVATION: Airmobile batteries utilize two eight (8) foot engineer stakes for the frame to hold the test target. Though, of somewhat crude construction, the stakes provide a lightweight, mobile stand.

e. ITEM: Firing on Reverse Slopes

(1) DISCUSSION: In mountainous terrain, artillery fire is often required on the reverse slope. A trajectory trace is necessary to insure that the projectile clears intermediate heights. If the trajectory does not clear these heights, high angle fire or low angle fire at the next lower charge is utilized. Firing at a lower charge has proven to be more effective, more accurate and more rapid to the response of the forward observer.

(2) OBSERVATION: In mountainous terrain, firing on reverse slopes require a trajectory trace at the battery FDC to insure clearance of intermediate crests. Firing at a lower charge provides accurate, effective and rapid fire.

f. ITEM: METRO Corrections for 6400 Mil Capability

(1) DISCUSSION: A solution for providing accurate artillery fire in a 6400 Mil direction has been determined. The means utilized is computing the metro message at the MET check point range for every 800 mils of direction. For each charge a Range K is then determined along with the appropriate charge. The Range K is then multiplied by the chart range and with the resulting total range correction, a GFT setting is applied. This GFT setting and the deflection correction for the charge and direction are used for this fire mission only. The results have been rapid, accurate, and effective fires.

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11
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SUBJECT: Operations Report-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

31 July 1967

(2) OBSERVATION: To insure accurate artillery fire throughout 6400 mils, the MET message is solved every 800 mils, and a Range K is determined utilizing the met check point range in computing the MET message. This solution has insured rapid, accurate and effective fire.

g. ITEM: Air and Ground Clearance For H&I Targets

(1) DISCUSSION: Air warning to aircraft is broadcast for each mission fired. When H&I targets are fired, because of the large number in a concentrated area, a block or area system is used within the DUC PHJ area of operation. Using this system, air data is required only for the area, which may contain from one to one hundred targets. The area consists of an outline of the specific blocks and terrain to be fired on and by broadcasting the limits of the block or area, an aircraft receives the same information which is needed for only one target. This system also simplifies ground clearance, as well as computation of data for air advisory.

(2) OBSERVATION: Using a block or area system for H&I targets, simplifies ground clearance of targets, computation of air advisory data, and broadcasting air warning. This system is utilized only in the present AO, and not throughout RVN.

h. ITEM: Observer Procedures

(1) DISCUSSION:

(a) Forward observers have found that adjustment of artillery rounds in mountainous terrain requires a different approach. Rounds should be adjusted vertically especially on mountain slopes, rather than adding or dropping in range.

(b) When firing medium artillery close to friendly troops in dense jungle, forward observers have achieved better results in opening the canopy by firing a converged sheaf. This procedure is utilized in the fire for effect phase of the mission, and it eliminates less effective results obtained when a normal dispersion of pieces is utilized.

(2) OBSERVATION: Forward observers have experienced different methods of adjusting artillery rounds in mountainous terrain and in dense jungle. These methods are not the normal type used.

5. (U) Logistics:

a. ITEM: Obturator Plugs

(1) DISCUSSION: This unit continues to experience difficulties in obtaining Obturator Plugs, Spindle (FSN 1025-730-5011). The short life of these plugs can be attributed to three factors:

- (a) Long and continuous firing of charge 7
- (b) Worn and old firing locks
- (c) Old powder, lacking flash suppressors

Although some plugs have been received during this reporting period, the level of 3 extra per firing battery which was recommended on the last ORLL has not been attained. The problem has been alleviated somewhat since joining TF OREGON due to the decreased number of rounds fired using charge 7.

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AVCE-VF

31 July 1967

SUBJECT: Operations Report-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

(2) OBSERVATION: To insure continuous operation of all howitzers, a minimum of three obturator plugs should be on hand in each firing battery PLL.

b. ITEM: Generators

(1) DISCUSSION: Generators are a major problem in RVN. The constant high temperatures accelerate engine wear to a great extent. The 10KW Military Standard air-cooled generator utilized by this unit's Metro section required a new engine after approximately 100 days of operation. The PE 75 2.5 KW generator, presently issued as a standby is not adequate to perform the mission. The 10 KW Hobart water-cooled generators used by signal units are operating very well in RVN, especially when two are operated on an, "on 4 hours off 4 hours basis"

(2) OBSERVATION: The air-cooled 10 KW generator used by the Metro section is not operating very well in RVN, and requires extensive maintenance in order to keep it operating. The water-cooled 10 KW works more effectively.

c. ITEM: Powder

(1) DISCUSSION: The powder received by this unit is old and in most cases marked "For Emergency Combat Use Only". In one instance, powder was fired which was 26 years old. Much of the powder is 10-14 years old. This powder does not attain the accuracy needed for close in support of ground gaining arms. Although care is taken to segregate the various lots of powder, the age and quality of powder received leaves much to be desired.

(2) OBSERVATION: Required accuracy for close in firing cannot be obtained from powder marked "For Emergency Combat Use Only".

d. ITEM: Metro Expendables

(1) DISCUSSION: Metro section has not received expendable supplies since arriving in-country. Items such as radiosonde balloons, and parachutes have been requisitioned and re-requisitioned with follow-ups to requisitions every 30 days. To date no supplies have been received.

(2) OBSERVATION: Metro supplies are not available through normal supply channels.

SECTION III
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration:

None.

2. (U) Intelligence:

That Aerial Observers be assigned permanent specific areas (roughly 6 kilometers by 8 kilometers) with responsibility to insure continuing intelligence.

3. (U) Training:

Recommend defensive driving instruction be given during ATT or prior to assignment to RVN.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-VF

31 July 1967

SUBJECT: Operations Report-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

4. (C) Operations:

a. Recommend that additional metro equipment be authorized giving the section the capability of providing visual observation for limited periods during which a unit is assigned a mission away from its base camp location.

b. Recommend additional radio mounts be authorized for the Battalion FDC section enabling radios to be mounted when FDC is located in semi-permanent installations.

c. Recommend light-weight but sturdy stakes be used for portable test target stand.

d. Recommend forward observers receive instruction in the Artillery Basic Course on the different methods of adjustment encountered in Vietnam, but not normally used in service practice or in other areas of operation and training.

e. Recommend system used to compute temporary GFT setting using Range K, and Met message be studied for possible incorporation in FM 6-40.

f. Recommend that area or block clearance of targets be incorporated throughout areas of operation.


5. (C) Logistics:

a. Recommend that the Direct Support maintenance battalion keep a minimum of two spindles for each firing battery in its ASL as a back-up to the units PLL.

b. Recommend the metro section be issued two 10 KW water-cooled Hobart generators to be used as the power source for the section.

c. Powder marked "For Emergency Combat Use Only" be used to fire H&I fires only. Further recommend this powder not be issued unless the combat emergency actually exists.

d. Recommend all metro sections deploying to RVN bring a full prescribed load of repair parts and attempt to obtain extra critical items such as teflon plungers and scanner bearings. Also recommend a 90 day supply of expendables such as radiosondes, balloons and parachutes be brought with the unit.


WALTER V. APPLGATE
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

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15
AVDF-GC (31 July 1967)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS TASK FORCE OREGON (PROVISIONAL), APO
San Francisco 96374

17 Sep 67

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO
San Francisco 96375

1. Attached is subject report of the 2d Bn, 11th Arty.
2. Reference Section II, para 4 a, b, and para 5b. The unit has been advised of actions which can be initiated for equipment in excess of authorizations.

FOR THE COMMANDER

1 Incl
as

s/O. A. Gerner Jr
t/O. A. GERNER JR
CPT, AGC
Asst Adj Gen

CC CONFIDENTIAL AL

16

AVHGC-DST (31 Jul 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 31 JUL 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (A2HA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning powder, page 10, paragraph c: Concur. 1st Logistical Command has been contacted to insure that powder charges marked "For emergency combat use only" are issued only in a true emergency; however, the practice of issuing the oldest serviceable lot first is standard and, with the rapid turnover, should not cause a problem.

b. Reference item concerning metro expendables, page 10, paragraph d: Concur. 1st Logistical Command has been tasked to correct this situation ASAP.

3. (U) Unit will be notified of actions and comments by routine indorsement which returns this report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

C CONFIDENTIAL AL


17
GPOP-DT (31 Jul 67) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (UIC: WA2HAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 1 DEC 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


HEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Security Classification

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

15